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INTRODUCTION
T he impact that environmental law has had upon business trans-
actions in recent years cannot be overstated. Increasingly, par-
ties involved in both commercial and residential real estate
transactions are finding that environmental issues can easily under-
mine proposed deals or, at a minimum, such issues have the capaci-
ty to substantially change the economics of the deal.' While parties
to the transaction may often be motivated by conflicting goals,
avoiding the retention or assumption, as the case may be, of envi-
ronmental liabilities will undoubtedly be a top priority.2
This Article will first present an overview of the statutory scheme
the parties to a business transaction are faced with, focusing on the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liabil-
ity Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"),a state transfer laws and lender liabil-
ity. Part II of this Article discusses the allocation of environmental
risks and liabilities in the context of a commercial transaction. Part
III examines the due diligence process, which is used to identify
* Ram Sundar is a Member of the New York City firm of Walter, Conston,
Alexander & Green, P.C.
** Bea Grossman is an Associate with Walter, Conston, Alexander & Green,
P.C.
1. See, e.g., Dave Lenckus, Cigna Plan Scrutinized; Regulators in Several
States Await Pennsylvania Action, Bus. INS., Jan. 8, 1996, at 6, available in
LEXIS, NEWS Library, BUSINS File; Centromin Auction Fails, PRIVATISATION
INT'L, June 1, 1994, available in WESTLAW, PRVINT Database.
2. Thomas O'Brien, Successor Liability-Are You Buying Trouble?, METRO.
CORP. COUNS., Jan. 1996, at 16, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, MCC File.
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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potential environmental exposure, and analyzes the impact of due
diligence findings on the bargaining process. This Article suggests
possible reforms to the existing statutory scheme that would pro-
vide greater predictability for the business community in assessing
exposure to environmental liability in commercial transactions.
I. THE STATUTORY SCHEME
For the purpose of this discussion, assume that ACE Corporation
("Seller" or "Target") wants to sell, and BEE Corporation ("Pur-
chaser") wants to purchase, a New Jersey industrial facility ("Facili-
ty") which routinely generates hazardous substances in its opera-
tion. Since the Purchaser is in the same line of business as the
Seller, it is familiar with the operations at the Facility. Assume
further that the purchase of the Facility will be financed by a com-
mercial lending institution.
There are a host of statutes on the federal, state, and local level
that may affect the Target's operations and this transaction. There
may, for example, be environmental liability associated with the
Facility's hazardous waste disposal practices under CERCLA.4 The
Facility's air emissions may require a permit under the Clean Air
Act.5 Similarly, the Facility's waste water and storm water might
require permitting under the Clean Water Act.6 The hazardous
waste generated by the Facility may be regulated by the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act.7 If the Facility generates chemical
substances,8 the testing, manufacturing, processing, and distribution
of those substances will be regulated under the Toxic Substance
and Control Act.9 The Occupational Safety and Health Act
("OSHA")"0 will regulate workplace health standards vis-a-vis the
toxic substances utilized at the Facility." In addition, the transfer
4. Id.
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
6. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
8. Section 2602(2) of the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-
2692 (1994), defines "chemical substance."
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1994).
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1994).
11. Under OSHA regulations, workers at the Facility must be kept informed
of the hazardous chemicals to which they may be exposed. Occupational Safety
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of the Facility may trigger the New Jersey Industrial Site Recovery
Act, 2 which is, in effect, a real property transfer restriction law. 3
Finally, local regulations may have an impact on operations at the
Facility, which may be a concern for the Purchaser if a change in
operations is anticipated after the sale. 4
The laws cited above are not intended to be an exhaustive list of
the statutes that may have an impact on this or any other transac-
tion. A due diligence investigation 5 should be performed in the
early stages of the transaction so that the impact of any statute af-
fecting operations at the Facility, as well as any statutes that might
regulate its transfer, can be identified, considered, and addressed.
and Health Standards, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1995). The primary mechanism for
this disclosure is the Material Safety Data Sheet ("MSDS"). Id. Among other
things, the MSDS should include the chemical's name, the hazards associated
with exposure to the chemical, and the type of immediate medical treatment that
should be administered if exposure does occur. Id.
12. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-6 (West Supp. 1995).
13. See, e.g., In re Cadgene Family Partnership, 286 N.J. Super. 270, 274
(1995) (non-compliance may void sale of property).
14. See, e.g., William L. Andreen, Defusing the "Not In My Back Yard" Syn-
drome: An Approach to Federal Preemption of State and Local Impediments to
the Siting of PCB Disposal Facilities, 63 N.C. L. REV. 811, 813 n.9 (1985). For
example, in response to the enactment of the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (1994), which includes a provision ordering EPA to pro-
mulgate rules governing disposal of Polychlorinated Biphenyls, several counties
enacted ordinances prohibiting storage or disposal of this substance. Id. (provid-
ing the following examples: DAYTON, OHIO, REV. CODE OF GEN. ORDINANCES
§§ 97.01-.09, 97.97-.99 (1980); Warren County, N.C., Ordinance Prohibiting the
Storage and Disposal of PCBs (Aug. 21, 1978); Union County, Ark., Ordinance
38 (Sept. 12, 1978); Chickasaw, Ala., Ordinance 1040 (Feb. 28, 1984)).
15. A due diligence investigation may be required to avoid liability under
certain environmental laws. See John Webster Kilborn, Comment, Purchaser
Liability for the Restoration of Illegally Filled Wetlands Under Section 404 of the
Clean Water Act, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 319, 347-348 (1991). Examples
of due diligence include "a site investigation to spot hazardous waste problems, a
historical review of a site, a search of agency files to detect past violations, an
analysis of aerial photographs, and chemical sampling of soil and water." Id.
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A. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act
CERCLA authorizes the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") to remediate sites contaminated with hazardous substanc-
es.16 CERCLA also provides for reimbursement of EPA's cleanup
costs from certain persons covered by the statute, known as poten-
tially responsible parties ("PRPs"). 17 Under CERCLA section
107(a), PRPs are liable for costs of removal and remedial action
incurred by the government, and response costs incurred by any
other person."8 In addition, PRPs are liable for damages associated
with the destruction or loss of natural resources." The four catego-
ries of PRPs under CERCLA include: (1) the current owner and
operator, who are liable for their own disposal practices as well as
those of past owners;' 0 (2) any party who owned or operated the
facility at the time of disposal of a hazardous substance;2 (3) gen-
erators of hazardous substances, who, by contract, agreement or
otherwise, arranged for the disposal or treatment of such substanc-
es;22 and (4) transporters who disposed of hazardous substances at
the site from which there is a release.23
CERCLA provides only limited defenses. A PRP can escape
liability only if it can establish that the release of the hazardous
substance was
caused solely by-
(1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war; [or]
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employ-
ee or agent of the [PRP], or than one whose act or omission
occurs in connection with a contractual relationship, existing
directly or
indirectly, with the [PRP] .....2
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
17. Id. § 9607(a) (1988).
18. Id.
19. Id. § 9611(b)(1) (1988).
20. Id. § 9607(a)(1).
21. Id. § 9607(a)(2).
22. Id. § 9607(a)(3).
23. Id. § 9607(a)(4).
24. Id. § 9607(b)(l)-(3).
TRANSACTIONAL DUE DILIGENCE
CERCLA also provides for the "innocent landowner defense,"'
which absolves a party from liability when certain conditions are
met.26 In order to prevail under this defense, the party must have
acquired the facility in question after the disposal of the hazard-
ous substances. 7 Additionally, the party must demonstrate that
there was no reason to know of such disposal, that due care with
respect to the hazardous substance was exercised, and that pre-
cautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any third party
were taken. 8 These stringent requirements illustrate the impor-
tance of conducting a thorough due diligence inquiry.
CERCLA's statutory scheme is glaringly harsh in many re-
spects. First, as noted above, liability may be imposed retroac-
tively on past owners and operators of a facility if disposal of a
hazardous substance occurred during their tenure, even if the
disposal was lawful.2 9 Second, CERCLA imposes strict liabili-
ty, 30 meaning that liability will attach to the PRP regardless of
intent. Thus, liability is not based on fault.31 Third, CERCLA
provides for joint and several liability, 32 so that any one of sev-
eral PRPs can be held liable for the entire cleanup. Since the cost
of cleaning up Superfund sites under CERCLA has, in some in-
25. See id. §§ 9601(35)(B), 9607(b)(3). Alternatively called the "innocent
purchaser defense," this exclusion is referred to by courts and commentators
alike. Westwood Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Nat'l Fuel Gas Distribution Corp., 964
F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Peterson Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F.
Supp. 1346, 1352 (N.D. I11. 1992); Kilborn, supra note 15, at 347.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 428-30 (D.N.J. 1991); United
States v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 546, 556-57 (W.D.N.Y.
1988).
30. United States v. Mexico Feed and Seed Co., 980 F.2d 478, 484 (8th Cir.
1992); see also United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 721 (2d
Cir. 1993) (listing the three factors that must exist for strict liability to apply).
31. United States v. Shell Oil Co., 841 F. Supp. 962, 968 (C.D. Cal. 1993);
United States v. Parsons, 723 F. Supp. 757, 760 (N.D. Ga. 1989).
32. United States v. Lang, 864 F. Supp. 610, 613-14 (E.D. Tex. 1994); Shell
Oil, 841 F. Supp. at 968.
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stances, exceeded $30 million,33 falling within CERCLA's broad
PRP category can be very expensive.
One of the most troubling issues that the Purchaser in our hy-
pothetical transaction will have to consider is the possibility that
the Facility may become a Superfund site or that hazardous waste
from the site may have been sent to a site that has been, or that
may later be, designated as a Superfund site. In this regard, a
thorough due diligence investigation should also incorporate a re-
view of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion and Liability Information System ("CERCLIS"),34 the data-
base of potentially hazardous waste sites35 that have been report-
ed to EPA by various sources.36 Some CERCLIS sites are also
on the National Priorities List ("NPL") or are in the screening
and assessment phase for possible inclusion on the NPL.37
While the Seller may have arranged for disposal of hazardous
waste in a lawful manner, CERCLA imposes strict liability for
cleanup costs if EPA can demonstrate that the Facility's wastes
were sent to a Superfund site.3' The Purchaser should try to
structure the transaction so as to reduce the possibility of acquir-
ing the Seller's environmental liabilities and thus becoming a
PRP by succession.39
33. Paula Harrington, Note, The Duty to Defend in California After Montrose
Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court: Is the California Supreme Court Protecting
Policyholders or Encouraging Litigation and the Early Settlement of Unworthy
Claims?, 31 CAL. W. L. REV. 165, 174 n. 65 (1994) (quoting MrCHELL L.
LATHROP, INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIMS, § 1.04[3]
(1994)).
34. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act Information System, available in LEXIS, ENVIRN Library, CERCLS File.
35. John A. Adams, Cost Recovery and Environmental Compliance Actions
for Hazardous Substances and Petroleum Products, UTAH B.J., Apr. 1993, at 9.
36. Potentially hazardous sites may be identified by several procedures, in-
cluding governmental inspection. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9603 (1988) (CERCLA
release reporting), 42 U.S.C. § 9605(d) (1988) (citizen request for site assess-
ment); 40 C.F.R. § 300.405 (1994) (information from other sources).
37. A site must receive a score of 28.5 to be eligible for inclusion on the
NPL. For more information on guidelines and factors used for scoring, see Ad-
ams, supra note 35, at 9.
38. United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1113-14 (D.N.J. 1983).
39. See infra part II.A.
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B. State Transfer Laws
As noted above,' our hypothetical transaction is also likely to
trigger the application of an environmental transfer law at the
state level, such as the New Jersey Industrial Site Recovery Act
("ISRA").4" New Jersey is one of several states that have enact-
ed legislation that in some way restricts the transfer of real prop-
erty. 2 These statutes run the gamut from requiring disclosure of
the environmental condition of the real property before it may be
transferred,43 to requiring state approval of the transaction."
ISRA is by far the most exacting of the transfer-restricting state
statutes.45 Generally, ISRA requires that the owner or operator
of an industrial establishment satisfy certain cleanup and
remediation requirements before selling or transferring either the
business or the property, or before closing down operations at the
site.'
The ISRA process is initiated by filing affidavits with the New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and Energy
("DEPE"), in which the transferor represents that there have been
no discharges of hazardous substances at the site.47 If there was
40. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13.
41. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-6 (West Supp. 1995).
42. Other states that have enacted property transfer legislation include Con-
necticut, Illinois, and Colorado. Connecticut Transfer Act, CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 22a-134 (1995); Responsible Property Transfer Act of 1988, ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 765, paras. 90/1 to 90/7 (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1995); State Hazardous
Waste Siting Act, COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 25-15-200.1 to 25-15-220 (1989 & Supp.
1995).
43. See Connecticut Transfer Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-134(a).
44. See ISRA, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13: 1K-9c (requiring approval by the Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection and Energy of a negative declaration or a
remedial action workplan prior to transfer of ownership or operations).
45. See generally Sarah L. Inderbitzin, Taking the Burden Off the Buyer: A
Survey of Hazardous Waste Disclosure Statutes, 1 ENVTL. LAW. 513 (1995) (stat-
ing that while ISRA requires disclosure to the state before any property transfer,
other states such as Illinois and Indiana, for example, only require disclosure to
the transferee).
46. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1 K-9 (procedure for transferring industrial
property).
47. Id. § 13:IK-9c. A representation that there has been no discharge of haz-
ardous substances at a site is called a "negative declaration." Id. § 13:1K-8.
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a discharge, it must have been cleaned up to the satisfaction of
DEPE.' If these affidavits are approved, DEPE issues a "no
further action letter."'49 In essence, this is a clearance by DEPE
giving permission to transfer the property." It is important to
keep in mind that since DEPE relies upon information submitted
by the transferor, a no further action letter is not a guarantee that
there will be no environmental liability associated with the site.5'
Again, from the Purchaser's perspective, conducting a thorough
due diligence investigation is imperative.
If DEPE identifies an area of the site that it would like to re-
view further, it will request that a remedial investigation work
plan be implemented.52 A cleanup plan will also have to be de-
veloped if the DEPE deems it necessary.53 DEPE will allow the
transfer of the property to go forward once the cleanup plan has
been approved. Depending on the condition of the property, ob-
taining state clearance from DEPE can turn into a lengthy process
and may, in fact, cause a delay in the closing of the transac-
tion.54 While the ISRA process represents an extreme example
of what a state may prescribe in this area of the law,55 sellers
and purchasers are well advised to identify and comply with the
state transfer laws applicable to their transaction early on to avoid
unnecessary closing delays.
48. See id. § 13:1K-91.
49. Id. § 13:1K-8 (defining "no further action letter").
50. Id.
51. See William W. Buzbee, Remembering Repose: Voluntary Contamination
Cleanup Approvals, Incentives, and the Costs of Interminable Liability, 80 MINN.
L. REV. 35, 117 n.257 (1995) (noting that a "no further action letter" provides
only limited protection).
52. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K-9d(2).
53. Id.
54. After compliance with ISRA's statutory requirements and submission of a
negative declaration to DEPE certifying the absence of hazardous waste on the
property, the DEPE has forty-five days to undertake its own investigation. Id.
§ 13:lK-9d(2). See also Inderbitzin, supra note 45, at 528.
55. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
TRANSACTIONAL DUE DILIGENCE
C. Lender Liability
Recall that the Purchaser in our hypothetical transaction is
seeking financing from a lending institution ("Lender") for the
purchase of the Facility. CERCLA's statutory framework and
recent case law have significantly increased the lending
community's environmental exposure in commercial transac-
tions. 6 Given the current state of the law, the Lender is likely to
proceed with great caution."
Despite the apprehension in the lending community caused by
CERCLA's inclusive liability scheme, there are reasons for lend-
ers to feel comfortable participating in commercial transactions.
As defined by the statute, "owner or operator" creates a qualified
exemption for any person who, without participating in the man-
agement of a facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to
protect its security interest in the facility." This qualified ex-
emption is referred to as the "Secured Creditor Exemption."59
The Secured Creditor Exemption came under great scrutiny in
United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.,' a case which has created
much concern within the lending community.
In Fleet Factors, a lending institution ("Fleet") agreed to ad-
vance funds to a cloth printing facility, Swainsboro Print Works
("SPW"), in exchange for an assignment of SPW's accounts re-
ceivable.6 As a condition of the loan, Fleet obtained a security
interest in SPW's textile facility, along with security interests in
SPW's equipment, inventory, and fixtures.62 After SPW default-
ed, Fleet foreclosed on the equipment and inventory and contract-
56. See Joel Mack, New Direction for Lenders Under Federal Superfund, 112
BANKING L.J. 590 (1995); Karin Oliva, Note, Lender Liability Under CERCLA,
68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1417 (1995).
57. See Lenders' Position Without Superfund Bill, ENVTL. LIAB. REP., Dec.
13, 1994, at 16, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database; FDIC Guidance
to Banks on 'E' Liability, ASBESTOS & LEAD ABATEMENT REP., Mar. 13, 1995,
available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
59. See United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1556 (11th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991).
60. 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991).
61. Id. at 1552.
62. Id.
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ed to conduct an auction of the collateral, but did not foreclose
on the property.63 Upon inspection, EPA found 700 fifty-five
gallon drums containing toxic chemicals and forty-four truckloads
of asbestos-containing materials. 64 The EPA later sued the stock-
holders of SPW and Fleet to recover the costs of cleaning up the
facility. 6
5
The critical issue in Fleet Factors was whether Fleet had par-
ticipated in the management of the facility sufficiently to incur
liability under CERCLA. The court adopted a standard under
which a secured party may incur liability under CERCLA by
participating in the financial management of a facility to a degree
indicating a "capacity to influence" the corporation's treatment of
hazardous wastes.' Under this standard, "a secured creditor will
be liable if its involvement with the management of the facility is
sufficiently broad to support the inference that it could affect
hazardous waste disposal decisions if it so chose."'67
Responding to the concern of banks and lending institutions
following the Fleet Factors decision, EPA promulgated a lender
liability rule ("Rule").6  The Rule was meant to broadly interpret
the Secured Creditor Exemption. The Rule made clear that a
lender will not be held liable if the only reason that an ownership
interest is held in the property is for the purpose of securing the
loan, and the lender does not participate in the management of
the facility.69 Under EPA's Rule, a lender would fail to satisfy the
criteria entitling it to the Secured Creditor Exemption if it exer-
cised decision-making control over the day-to-day management of
the facility's environmental compliance or operational matters.7"
The Rule also protected a secured creditor who foreclosed on its
collateral, as long as the creditor took certain diligent efforts to
divest itself of the property in a reasonably expeditious manner
63. Id. at 1552-53.
64. Id. at 1553.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1557.
67. Id. at 1558.
68. 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344 (1992) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300).
69. Id.
70. Id.
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and did not participate in the management of the property prior to
foreclosure.71
In Kelley v. United States EPA,72 however, the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia invalidated EPA's Rule. The
Kelley court held that EPA lacked statutory authority to define,
through regulation, the scope of lender liability under
CERCLA.73 It should be noted that a number of courts that have
considered the Secured Creditor Exemption, and that have applied
EPA's Rule, have held in favor of the lenders. 74 Given the hold-
ing in Kelley, however, it is not clear whether these courts would
have ruled in the same fashion had they not been able to consider
EPA's Rule. Nonetheless, the Secured Creditor Exemption has
been at issue in many recent cases which have been decided in
favor of lenders, without consideration of EPA's Rule.75
One such case is In re Bergsoe Metal Corp.76 In Bergsoe, the
Ninth Circuit noted that CERCLA provides little guidance as to
the level of control a secured creditor may exert over a facility
before it will be liable for cleanup. 77 The court held that a se-
cured party will not be held liable merely because it holds title to
the property as part of a financing arrangement.7 ' Although the
court cited Fleet Factors in its decision, it chose not to adopt the
standards set forth therein and noted that "there must be some
actual management of the facility before a secured creditor will
fall outside the exception."'79 The court further noted that the
71. Id.
72. 15 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied sub nom. American Bankers'
Ass'n v. Kelley, 115 S. Ct. 900 (1995).
73. Id. at 1107-08.
74. See, e.g., Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Sonford Prods. Corp., 810 F. Supp. 1057,
1060 (D. Minn. 1993) (holding that lender engaging in ordinary lending activities
was shielded from liability by application of 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) and EPA's
Lender Liability Rule); Kelly v. Tiscornia, 810 F. Supp. 901, 906 (W.D. Mich.
1993) (following the Lender Liability Rule and concluding that mere influence
over a borrower is not a sufficient basis for the imposition of CERCLA liability).
75. See United States v. McLamb, 5 F.3d 69, 73 (4th Cir. 1993); Waterville
Indus. v. Finance Auth. of Maine, 984 F.2d 549, 553 (1st Cir. 1993).
76. 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
77. Id. at 672.
78. Id. at 671-72.
79. Id. at 672 (emphasis added).
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sole fact "that a secured creditor reserves certain rights to protect
its investment does not put it in a position of management."8
The critical factor is not what rights the creditor has, but what
rights have been exercised.8 It should be noted, however, that
Bergsoe was decided before EPA's Rule was finalized.
Similar results have been reached in a number of cases:
Waterville Industries v. Finance Authority of Maine,83 United
States v. McLamb, 4 Northeast Doran v. Key Bank of Maine!,
In all of these cases, the Secured Creditor Exemption was upheld
without consideration of EPA's Rule.86 Interestingly, in all of
these cases, the lenders foreclosed on the mortgagors' real proper-
ty, which was later sold to another party.87 Yet in all three cases,
the courts found that "ownership" of the property did not invali-
date the Secured Creditor Exemption.88 The Doran court, quot-
ing the Waterville opinion, noted:
[T]he purpose of the statutory exception, apparent from its lan-
guage and statutory context, is to shield from liability those "own-
ers" who are in essence lenders holding title to the property as
security for the debt. Moreover, so long as the [security interest
holder] makes a reasonably prompt effort to divest itself of its
unwelcome ownership, we think continued coverage under the
exception serves its basic policy: to protect bona fide lenders and
to avoid imposing liability on owners who are not in fact seeking
to profit from the investment opportunity normally presented by
prolonged ownership.89
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. EPA's Rule was finalized on April 29, 1992. See 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344
(1992) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300).
83. 984 F.2d 549 (1st Cir. 1993).
84. 5 F.3d 69 (4th Cir. 1993).
85. 15 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1994).
86. Northeast Doran, 15 F.3d at 2-3; McLamb, 5 F.3d at 73-74; Waterville,
984 F.2d at 554.
87. Northeast Doran, 15 F.3d at 2; McLamb, 5 F.3d at 70; Waterville, 984
F.2d at 550-51.
88. Northeast Doran, 15 F.3d at 3; McLamb, 5 F.3d at 71-72; Waterville, 984
F.2d at 552.
89. Northeast Doran, 15 F.3d at 2 (citing Waterville, 984 F.2d at 552-53).
TRANSACTIONAL DUE DILIGENCE
Under the current state of the law, lenders may unwittingly find
themselves saddled with liability under CERCLA simply because
they attempted to protect their security interests. 9' To truly pro-
tect themselves, secured creditors who take control of their collat-
eral through foreclosure should not take control over the manage-
ment of the facility or the decision-making process concerning
the disposition of the facility's hazardous substances.
II. THE ALLOCATION OF RISKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY BETWEEN THE PARTIES
The allocation between the parties of the risks and responsibili-
ties associated with environmental liability is an issue that must
be addressed in every commercial transaction involving the trans-
fer of real estate. CERCLA's statutory scheme and the case law
interpreting it have had a significant impact on the issues related
to commercial transactions, such as the manner in which transac-
tions are structured, the due diligence that is performed on behalf
of the purchaser, the subsequent negotiations that inevitably fol-
low the due diligence investigation, and the form of purchase
agreement ultimately executed by the parties.9
A. Structure of the Transaction
In structuring the transaction, one of the critical factors that
will receive immediate attention is the allocation of risks and re-
sponsibilities in connection with the Facility's environmental
liabilities. The Purchaser will seek to purchase the Facility
without acquiring any of the Seller's existing environmental lia-
bilities. In this regard, the Purchaser will need to consider a-num-
ber of options. For example, ACE Corporation could be acquired
indirectly by the Purchaser through a corporate subsidiary.92
90. Oliva, supra note 56, at 1428.
91. STANDARD PRACTICE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SITE ASSESSMENTS: PHASE I
ENVIRONMENTAL SITE ASSESSMENT PROCESS E, E1527-93 § 1.1.1 (Am. Soc'y
for Testing and Materials 1993) [hereinafter PHASE I ENVIRONMENTAL SITE AS-
SESSMENT PROCESS]; STANDARD PRACTICE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SITE ASSESS-
MENTS: TRANSACTION SCREEN PROCESS E, E1528-93 § 1.1.1 (Am. Soc'y for
Testing and Materials 1993).
92. See, e.g., Western Helicopters, Inc. v. Hiller Aviation, Inc., 97 B.R. I
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Alternatively, the Purchaser could acquire all of the Seller's stock
in ACE Corporation and become the Seller's corporate succes-
sor.93 On the other hand, the Purchaser may wish to limit the ac-
quisition to certain assets currently held by ACE Corporation.94
Unfortunately, and much to the Purchaser's dismay, none of these
scenarios provides the Purchaser with a complete shield against
the Seller's existing environmental liabilities under current law.95
1. Corporate Parent Liability Under CERCLA
Under the doctrine of limited liability, a parent corporation is
generally not liable for the debts or acts of its subsidiary.96
While limited liability remains the norm under American corpora-
tion laws, the courts have created exceptions to this rule.97 The
issue of corporate parent liability has been analyzed in much
detail by the courts in cases arising under CERCLA.98 Parent
corporations may be held liable for their subsidiary's environmen-
tal cleanup costs on either of two theories: (1) the corporate par-
ent is found to be directly liable as an operator of the contami-
nated site," or (2) the court may pierce the corporate veil so as
(E.D. Cal. 1988).
93. See, e.g., G.L. Canfield v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654 F.2d 459 (7th Cir.
1981).
94. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Wilbur, 783 F. Supp. 329 (E.D. Mich. 1992);
Packquisition Corp. v. Packard Press New England, No. Civ. A. 91-5966, 1992
WL 345098 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 1992).
95. See David Fink, Impact of Clean-Up Laws on Property Business Deals,
MICH. LAW. WEEKLY, Sept. 26, 1994, at 29.
96. Thomas O'Brien, Successor Liability-Are You Buying Trouble?, METRO.
CORP. COUNS., Jan. 1996, at 16, available in LEXIS, News Library, MCC File.
97. Exceptions to the general rule of limited liability are made in cases of: (1)
corporate parent domination and control of its subsidiary corporation; (2) use of
the corporation for fraudulent or illegal purposes; or (3) draining of the
corporation's assets by its shareholders. United States v. Jon-T Chems., Inc., 768
F.2d 686, 691 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014 (1986).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1084 (1991); Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893
F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1108 (1991).
99. See, e.g., Jacksonville Elec. Auth. v. Bernuth Corp., 996 F.2d 1107, 1109-
10 (11th Cir. 1988); Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 26-27.
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to find the parent indirectly liable for the actions of its subsid-
iary.10
The leading cases concerning corporate parent liability in the
environmental context are United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp.'01
and Joslyn Manufacturing Co. v. T.L. James & Co. 2 In
Kayser-Roth, the parent corporation was held liable as an operator
for the cleanup costs of its subsidiary. 3 The Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit noted that "a fair reading of CERCLA allows
a parent corporation to be held liable as an operator of a subsid-
iary corporation."'' 4 Without deciding the exact standard neces-
sary for a parent to be an operator, the court indicated that not
only was a showing of complete ownership required, combined
with general authority or the ability to control that comes with
ownership, but that, at a minimum, there must be a showing of
active involvement in the activities of the subsidiary. 5
The Fifth Circuit undertook a much different analysis of corpo-
rate parent liability under CERCLA in Joslyn."° The Court of
Appeals found that CERCLA's reach did not extend to parent
corporations whose subsidiaries are found liable under the stat-
ute. 7 While agreeing that a parent corporation could be found
liable under CERCLA by piercing the corporate veil, the court
100. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
101. 910 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1084 (1991).
102. 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1108 (1991).
103. Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 27-28.
104. Id. at 27.
105. The following factors were considered by the Kayser-Roth court in hold-
ing the parent liable as an operator: (1) the parent corporation had total monetary
control over its subsidiary, including collection of accounts payable; (2) the par-
ent corporation restricted its subsidiary's financial budget; (3) the parent corpora-
tion directed that all governmental matters, including environmental matters, be
funneled through the parent; (4) the parent's approval was required before the
subsidiary could lease, buy, or sell real property; (5) the parent's approval was
required for any capital transfer or expenditure greater than $5,000; and (6) the
parent placed its personnel in almost all of its subsidiary's directorship and offi-
cer positions as a means of ensuring that the parent's corporate policy was imple-
mented and precisely carried out. Id. (citing United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp.,
724 F. Supp. 15, 18 (D.R.I. 1989)).
106. 893 F.2d 80.
107. Id. at 82-83.
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held that the facts in this case did not justify such action. 8 In
setting out the criteria for analyzing the issue of control in the
parent/subsidiary context, the court made reference to its prior
decision in United States v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc."° In that
case, the court provided a list of factors to be considered in deter-
mining whether a parent controls its subsidiary to an extent that
justifies piercing the corporate veil."0
To some extent, the decisions in both Kayser-Roth and Joslyn
provide "guidelines" that parent corporations can follow to avoid
liability arising from the activities of their subsidiaries. The prob-
lem, however, is that the relationship between a parent corpora-
tion and its subsidiary, by its very nature, is often based upon a
certain measure of control."' For example, the corporate parent
frequently causes the incorporation of its subsidiary."' In addi-
tion, it is not uncommon for the corporate parent to finance its
subsidiary, or for it to have some active involvement in the busi-
ness of its subsidiary." 3 In short, the guidelines provided by
current case law are not clear and offer little reassurance to the
108. Id. at 83 (supporting piercing the corporate veil only in instances of
fraud).
109. 768 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014 (1986).
110. The court held that the list of factors to be considered are:
(1) the parent and the subsidiary have common stock ownership; (2)
the parent and the subsidiary have common directors or officers; (3)
the parent and the subsidiary have common business departments; (4)
the parent and the subsidiary file consolidated financial statements and
tax returns; (5) the parent finances the subsidiary; (6) the parent
caused the incorporation of the subsidiary; (7) the parent operates with
grossly inadequate capital; (8) the parent pays the salaries and other
expenses of the subsidiary; (9) the subsidiary receives no business
except that given to it by the parent; (10) the parent uses the
subsidiary's property as its own; (11) the daily operations of the two
corporations are not kept separate; and (12) the subsidiary does not
observe the basic corporate formalities, such as keeping separate
books and records and holding shareholder and board meetings.
Id. at 691-92.
111. See PHILLIP A. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROBLEMS
OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS UNDER STATUTORY LAW OF GEN-
ERAL APPLICATION § 2.02.3 (1989).
112. See, e.g., Jon-T, 768 F.2d at 689.
113. Id.
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corporate parent who seeks to protect itself against environmental
liability resulting from the actions of its subsidiary.
2. Successor Liability
If BEE Corporation opts to acquire all of Seller's stock in ACE
Corporation, it may expose itself to Seller's environmental liabili-
ties by virtue of successor liability. A transaction that is limited
to the acquisition of certain assets, as opposed to a stock acquisi-
tion, may not necessarily enable the Purchaser to remain free and
clear of the Seller's environmental claims. These two types of
transactions are tied together in the, analysis of corporate succes-
sor liability.
The issue of successor liability under CERCLA has not been
specifically addressed by Congress.""4 The courts, however,
have tried to create a rule which is consistent with the broad
remedial goals of CERCLA, and also takes into account tradition-
al concerns of corporate law."5 The general rule with respect to
successor liability is that "where one corporation purchases busi-
ness assets from another corporation, and a fair consideration was
paid, the purchaser does not, simply by virtue of the asset pur-
chase transaction, become responsible for the seller's liabili-
ties.""'6 There are, however, four well-recognized exceptions to
this rule: (1) the purchaser of assets expressly or impliedly agrees
to assume the obligations of the transferor; (2) the transaction
amounts to a consolidation or a de facto merger; (3) the purchas-
ing corporation is merely a continuation of the seller; or (4) the
transaction is fraudulent because it was entered into to escape
liability.' 17
114. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. ASARCO, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260, 1262 (9th Cir.
1990); Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3d
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989).
115. See, e.g., United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 837-
38 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Mexico Feed and Seed Co., 980 F.2d 478,
487 (8th Cir. 1992); Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 909 F.2d at 1263.
116. City Envtl., Inc. v. United States Chem. Co., 814 F. Supp. 624, 634 (E.D.
Mich. 1993) (emphasis added), affd sub nom. City Mgmt. Corp. v. United States
Chem. Co., 43 F.3d 244 (6th Cir. 1994).
117. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 909 F.2d at 1263; Atlantic Richfield Co. v.
Blosenski, 847 F. Supp. 1261, 1283-84 (E.D. Pa. 1994); City Envtl., Inc., 814 F.
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If the Purchaser acquires all of the Seller's stock in ACE Cor-
poration, or even if the transaction is limited to a sale of certain
assets, the "mere continuation" exception may potentially form
the basis for corporate successor liability." 8 The scope of this
exception has been expanded in certain jurisdictions to determine
whether one corporation is the successor of another."9 Under
this expanded approach, also referred to as the "continuity of
enterprise" theory, the court considers a series of factors, which
include: whether the purchaser (1) retains the same employees
and production facilities; (2) produces the same products; (3)
maintains the same assets and business operations; (4) retains the
same business name; and (5) holds itself out to the public as a
continuation of the previous enterprise. 2 '
It should be noted that the law regarding corporate successor
liability in the context of products liability differs among the
states. The "product line theory" of liability, followed by a mi-
nority of states,'2' was formulated in 1977 by the California
Supreme Court, in Ray v. Alad Corp.'22 Finding that none of the
four traditional exceptions to the general rule of successor lia-
bility were present in that case, the Ray court created a new ex-
ception applicable in strict tort liability cases.2 3 Under this new
exception, strict liability is imposed upon the successor manu-
facturer if
(1) the virtual destruction of the plaintiff's remedies against the
original manufacturer was caused by the successor's acquisition of
the business; (2) the successor has the ability to assume the origi-
Supp. at 634.
118. See, e.g., Kane v. Magna Mixer Co., 71 F.3d 555, 560-61 n.1 (6th Cir.
1995).
119. See City Envtl., Inc., 814 F. Supp. at 635.
120. United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 838 (4th Cir.
1992); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Blosenski, 847 F. Supp. 1261, 1284 (E.D. Pa.
1994).
121. Some of the states that follow the product line theory are New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Colorado, and Washington. See, e.g., LaFountain v.
Webb Indus. Corp., 759 F. Supp. 236 (E.D. Pa. 1991), affd, 951 F.2d 544 (3d
Cir. 1991); Roy v. Bolens Corp., 629 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Mass. 1986); Hickman
v. Thomas C. Thompson Co., 592 F. Supp. 1282 (D. Colo. 1984).
122. 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
123. Id. at 8-11.
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nal manufacturer's risk-spreading role; and (3) it is fair to require
the successor to assume responsibility for defective products that
were a burden necessarily attached to the original manufacturer's
good-will being enjoyed by the successor in the continued opera-
tion of the business.1
24
It is important to note that following Ray, cases in California
and elsewhere have required that all three prongs be satisfied be-
fore liability is imposed on the successor corporation."z Thus,
the absence of the causation factor will generally result in a find-
ing of no corporate successor liability.1 26 In other words, corpo-
rate successor liability is generally not imposed if the purchaser
played no role in the predecessor's dissolution) 27
Surprisingly, there is very little case law addressing the issue of
whether successor liability may be imposed in a limited asset pur-
chase transaction. 28 It appears, however, at least by implication,
that successor liability cannot be imposed unless there is a show-
ing that the successor corporation acquired "all or at least 'sub-
stantially all"' of the assets of the predecessor corporation. 1 9 In
New York v. N. Storonske Cooperage Co.,3° the State sued for
cost recovery and relief under CERCLA, Container Management
Corporation, the successor to the defendant, the North Storonske
Cooperage Co.' The defendant's position was that a necessary
precursor to the imposition of successor liability is the require-
ment that there be, at a minimum, a transfer of all or substantially
124. Id. at 8-9.
125. Phillips v. Cooper Labs., 264 Cal. Rptr. 311 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Lundell
v. Sidney Mach. Tool Co., 236 Cal. Rptr. 70 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
126. See, e.g., Stewart v. Telex Comm., Inc., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 669 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991).
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., City Envtl., Inc. v. United States Chem. Co., 814 F. Supp. 624,
635 (E.D. Mich. 1993), affd sub nom. City Mgt. Corp. v. United States Chem.
Co., 43 F.3d 244 (6th Cir. 1994); Green v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 460
N.E.2d 895, 899 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); Fenton Area Pub. Sch. v. Sorenson-Gross
Constr. Co., 335 N.W.2d 221, 225 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
129. New York v. N. Storonske Cooperage Co., 174 B.R. 366 (N.D.N.Y.
1994).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 369.
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all of the selling corporation's assets .1' The Storonske court cit-
ed two cases which, in dicta, bolster this argument.13
3
The Storonske court did not, however, need to determine
whether there may be a finding of successor liability when some-
thing less than all or substantially all of the predecessor
corporation's assets are transferred to the successor because it
found that such a transfer had been accomplished in this case.3
The court noted that "given the remedial nature of CERCLA, a
lenient reading of the 'all or substantially all' requirement is
probably justified .... [A] strict construction of the 'all or sub-
stantially all' language would, in all likelihood, thwart the reme-
dial goals of CERCLA; and thus this court does not countenance
such an approach.'
'35
Given the Storonske court's lenient reading of the "all or sub-
stantially all" language, the decision provides little guidance in
cases where it is unclear whether all or substantially all of the
assets have been transferred to the successor corporation. 136
Though it did not squarely address the issue, the court's decision
appears to indicate that the substantial-continuity-of-enterprise
rule would be inapplicable in cases where the assets transferred
are clearly limited in nature.'37
If we assume that the assets transferred to Purchaser are not
limited in nature, or if Purchaser decides to acquire all of Seller's
stock in ACE Corporation, a court must consider two additional
factors prior to the imposition of successor liability under the
continuity of enterprise theory. Although all of the factors which
make up the continuity of enterprise theory 38 are examined by
the courts with great scrutiny, two additional factors appear to
play a decisive role in whether liability attaches to the successor
corporation.'39
132. Id. at 377-78.
133. See Williams v. Bowman Livestock Equip. Co., 927 F.2d 1128 (10th Cir.
1991); Long v. AT&T Info. Sys., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
134. Storonske, 174 B.R. at 378.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 387.
138. See supra text accompanying note 120.
139. Storonske, 174 B.R. at 388.
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One of the additional factors is the presence of "substantial
ties" or the existence of a relationship between the successor cor-
poration and its predecessor."4 In one case, for example, the
substantial ties between the predecessor and successor corporation
consisted of a familial relationship between the two parties and
common shareholders."' The other additional factor is the suc-
cessor corporation's knowledge of the seller's environmental
liabilities.'42
It should be noted that in holding that the successor corporation
had knowledge of the predecessor corporation's CERCLA liabili-
ty, the district court in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Blosenski made
the following observation in a footnote:
Although we are not inclined to limit the application of the sub-
stantial continuity test to occasions when the purchaser has knowl-
edge or actual notice of the seller's CERCLA liability, it may be
proper to reserve substantial continuity successor liability for a
purchaser who should have known after reasonable investigation of
the seller's potential liability. This would be consistent with
CERCLA's "innocent landowner" defense, which is intended to
prevent innocent purchasers of land from being held liable under
CERCLA for unknown hazardous dumping or polluting by previ-
ous owners.
143
Based on this decision, the "prerequisite" of the substantial-conti-
nuity-of-enterprise rule may be interpreted as requiring that the
successor corporation have no knowledge of the predecessor's
environmental liability after having conducted a reasonable inves-
tigation into such matters.'" Once again, the importance of a
thorough due diligence investigation cannot be overemphasized.
140. United States v. Atlas Minerals & Chem., Inc., 824 F. Supp. 46, 51 (E.D.
Pa. 1993); City Envtl., Inc. v. United States Chem. Co., 814 F. Supp. 624, 638
(E.D. Mich. 1993), affd sub nom. City Mgt. Corp. v. United States Chem. Corp.,
43 F.3d 244 (6th Cir. 1994).
141. United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 835 (4th Cir.
1992).
142. United States v. Mexico Feed and Seed Co., 980 F.2d 478, 488 (8th Cir.
1992); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Blosenski, 847 F. Supp. 1261, 1287 (E.D. Pa.
1994).
143. Atlantic Richfield, 847 F. Supp. at 1287 n.26 (citations omitted).
144. Id.
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3. Corporate Officer Liability
Regardless of the form of the transaction, one of Purchaser's
foremost concerns will be that the officers, directors, and share-
holders of BEE Corporation are not held personally liable for the
Facility's environmentally-related claims. Under traditional com-
mon law principles, unless a court determines that the existing
facts warrant a piercing of the corporate veil, the corporation's
separate legal structure is respected, and its officers, directors,
and shareholders are protected from personal liability emanating
from the corporation's activities.45 The law has been changing
over the years, however, with respect to environmental liability,
with the result that officers, directors, and shareholders have
found themselves personally responsible for the cost of cleaning
up the facilities owned by the corporation."
In expanding the basis upon which officers, directors, and
shareholders are held personally responsible for environmental
liability, courts generally follow the same analysis applied in the
context of corporate parent liability. One option is to hold the
corporate officer liable in an individual capacity as an operator of
the facility.'47 Under this view, the individual's liability is based
upon his or her own acts or omissions, irrespective of corporate
officer status."
145. See Sidney S. Arst Co. v. Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund, 25 F.3d 417,
420 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that "it is generally settled that the shareholders,
directors and officers of a corporation are not liable for the obligations or delicts
of the corporation"). See also, e.g., Main Bank of Chicago v. Baker, 427 N.E.2d
94, 101 (Ill. 1981); Gallagher v. Reconco Builders, Inc., 415 N.E.2d 560, 563
(Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
146. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(20)(A), 9607(a); see also, e.g., Riverside Mkt. Dev.
Corp. v. International Bldg. Prods., Inc., 931 F.2d 327, 330 (5th Cir. 1991) (stat-
ing that "CERCLA prevents individuals from hiding behind the corporate shield
when as 'operators,' they themselves actually participate in the wrongful conduct
prohibited by the Act"); United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 26-27
(1st Cir. 1990) (noting cases in which shareholders were held liable as "opera-
tors" under CERCLA); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem.
Co., 810 F.2d 726, 743-44 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that the Congress intended
CERCLA liability to attach to corporate officers), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848
(1987).
147. See, e.g., Riverside Mkt., 931 F.2d at 330; Kayser-Roth, 910 F.2d at 26-
27; Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d at 743-44.
148. 3A S. FLANAGAN & C. KEATING, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
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Under a second theory, the corporate officer is held
derivatively liable through the piercing of the corporate veil.'49
Under this view, a court looks beyond the corporate structure and
examines the activities of the officers as they relate to the
corporation's waste disposal practices. 5 ' In this regard,
CERCLA itself provides a basis for the imposition of this theory
of liability in that any person who arranged for the disposal of
hazardous substances is strictly liable for the costs of cleaning up
the contaminated property.' These words have been interpreted
by some courts as including corporate officers.'52 The Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, for example, has held that the
term "person" includes both individuals and corporations and
does not exclude corporate officers or employees. 153
Different standards are applied by the courts when imposing
liability based upon the activities of corporate officers. Indeed, it
appears that there may be a split among the courts in this regard.
A number of federal circuit courts have held corporate officers
personally responsible for environmental liability only in instanc-
es where the officer (1) actually participated in the operation of
the facility; (2) exercised control over the facility; or (3) was
significantly involved in the corporation's operations.'54 This
standard is referred to as the "actual control test.""' Other
courts have taken a broader approach to corporate officer liabil-
ity."' Under this approach, referred to as the "prevention test,"
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1135 (1994) ("Corporate officers are liable for their
torts, although committed when acting officially.").
149. See, e.g., Arst, 25 F.3d at 420; Riverside, 931 F.2d at 330 (citing North-
eastern Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d at 744).
150. Riverside, 931 F.2d at 330; Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d at
744.
151. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3).
152. See, e.g., United States v. USX Corp., 68 F.3d 811, 824-25 (3d Cir. 1995)
(plain language of CERCLA imposes transporter liability on corporate officers
and shareholders only if they "actually participated in liability-creating conduct").
153. Northeastern Pharmaceutical, 810 F.2d at 743.
154. See, e.g., USX Corp., 68 F.3d at 822-23; see also Jacksonville Elec. Auth.
v. Bermuth Corp., 996 F.2d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 1993); United States v. Kayser-
Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 27-28 (1st Cir. 1990).
155. USX Corp., 68 F.3d at 822.
156. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, No. 1:90:CV:851, 1994 WL 512758,
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the corporate officer is held personally liable if he simply had
authority over the corporation's hazardous waste disposal practic-
es and could have prevented the contamination.'57 Given the
foregoing, BEE Corporation's officers, directors, and shareholders
must be cognizant of the fact that, if they exercise control over
the Facility or have the authority to control the Facility's waste
disposal practices, they may well incur personal liability with re-
spect to the Facility's environmental claims.
B. The Purchase Agreement
The environmental conditions in our hypothetical transaction,
associated with the Facility, both on-site and off-site, will have a
significant impact on the purchase agreement from the perspec-
tive of both Seller and Purchaser. For the agreement to be com-
prehensive, Purchaser should ask Seller to make certain represen-
tations and warranties in the purchase agreement as to the envi-
ronmental quality of the Facility. For example, Purchaser will
clearly want Seller to represent that none of the Facility's hazard-
ous substances has been sent to Superfund sites or to sites that
are the subject of any investigations that may lead to environmen-
tal claims. Purchaser will also want Seller to represent that the
Facility's hazardous wastes were handled and delivered to duly
authorized and licensed carriers for disposal, in compliance with
applicable environmental laws.
Additionally, Purchaser will want Seller to make certain repre-
sentations concerning a number of issues, such as: (1) the pres-
ence of on-site contamination;'58 (2) the presence of asbestos
and polychlorinated biphenyls at the Facility;'59 (3) the status of
the Facility's compliance with applicable federal and state regula-
*12 (W.D. Mich. May 18, 1994); Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 727 F. Supp.
1532, 1543 (W.D. Mich. 1989); Kelley v. Arco Indus. Corp., 723 F. Supp. 1214,
1219 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
157. For a discussion of these two standards, see Robertshaw Controls Co. v.
Watts Regulator Co., 807 F. Supp. 144 (D. Me. 1992).
158. Judith G. Tracy, Beyond Caveat Emptor: Disclosure to Buyers of Contam-
inated Land, 10 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 169 (1991).
159. Matthew A. Melone, Taxable Corporate Acquisitions: A Primer for Busi-
ness and the Non-Specialist, 25 U. TOL. L. REv. 673, 686 (1994).
1996] TRANSACTIONAL DUE DILIGENCE 375
tory requirements;"6° (4) the status of the Facility's environmen-
tal, health and safety permits; 61 (5) the status of pending or
threatened litigation with respect to violations of environmental
laws; (6) the presence of underground storage tanks at the Facili-
ty;" (7) the presence of liens on the Facility arising under en-
vironmental laws; 63 and (8) the presence of wetlands on the
Facility.6 4 To the extent the Seller is unable to make these rep-
resentations, the relevant facts should be disclosed as exceptions
in a schedule to the Purchase Agreement.
As mentioned throughout this Article, Purchaser should arrange
to have a thorough due diligence investigation of the Target per-
formed, which should include an environmental site assessment of
the Facility. Ideally, this issue will be addressed in the Purchase
Agreement by providing that Purchaser's obligation to close on
the transaction is subject to the completion of an environmental
assessment of the Facility by an environmental engineering firm
acceptable to Purchaser. 65 Additionally, Purchaser should also
require in the Purchase Agreement that Purchaser's approval of
the assessment, as well as the report describing the results of the
160. Geoffrey D. Patterson, A Buyer's Catalogue of Prepurchase Precautions
to Minimize CERCLA Liability in Commercial Real Estate Transactions, 15 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 469, 490-91 (1992); Tracy, supra note 158, at 224-26.
161. Patterson, supra note 160, at 491.
162. Id.
163. "All appropriate inquiry" includes "commonly known or reasonably ascer-
tainable information about the property." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B) (1988). State
and federal liens are considered to be included within that definition. Inderbitzin,
supra note 45, at 518 n. 11.
164. Development activities for wetlands and other water bodies are covered by
the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403, 407 (1988), and the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. V
1993). A permit may be required under one of these statutes for certain types of
projects, sources and water bodies. 33 U.S.C. §§ 403, 1344. See also Sharon M.
Mattox, Regulatory Obstacles to Development and Redevelopment in the U.S.:
Wetlands and Other Essential Issues, in THE IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
ON REAL ESTATE AND OTHER COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS CA945 A.L.I.-
A.B.A. 603 (1994).
165. See supra part III.A.
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assessment, be prerequisites to the successful closing of the trans-
action."6
Finally, the Purchase Agreement should include an indemnifi-
cation section." This section should provide, among other
things, that Seller will hold Purchaser harmless against any liabil-
ity resulting from any breach of Seller's representations or inci-
dent to any environmental claim arising out of the conduct of the
Target prior to the closing.168 The Agreement should also pro-
vide that Seller will defend and indemnify Purchaser for any such
liability.'69 Seller is likely to insist that financial and temporal
levels be set, which will trigger responsibility on behalf of Seller
for the costs of a claim presented by Purchaser after closing.
CERCLA-related claims are financially draining, however, and
Purchaser may not have knowledge of such a claim until years
later. '7 Thus, Purchaser should try to obtain indemnification
from Seller that does not impose dollar or time limits on Seller's
obligations to indemnify Purchaser.
A critical factor to be considered in this regard is that indemni-
fication will provide Purchaser with protection only if Seller re-
mains financially viable following the closing of the transaction.
For example, the authors were recently involved in a transaction
in which the purchaser was obtaining stock from a seller com-
prised of approximately forty different shareholders. This created
a problem in securing an effective indemnification. The transac-
tion was structured so as to provide that the purchase price would
be paid in installments, with the last payment due at the expira-
tion of the survival period provided for in the purchase agree-
ment. This arrangement provided the purchaser with an adequate
amount of comfort to proceed with the transaction.
166. See supra part III.B.
167. Elizabeth A. Glass, The Modern Snake in the Grass: An Examination of
Real Estate and Commercial Liability Under Superfund and SARA and Suggested
Guidelines for the Reorganization, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 381, 439
(1987).
168. See supra text accompanying notes 158-164.
169. See Glass, supra note 167, at 439.
170. See infra text accompanying notes 172-174.
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III. THE FACT FINDING MISSION: THE DUE DILIGENCE
INVESTIGATION
The selection of the due diligence team is a vital step in the
due diligence process. The risks involved in a commercial real es-
tate transaction make the role of the due diligence team particu-
larly important. The main function of the due diligence team will
be the preparation of the Environmental Site Assessment.
A. The Due Diligence Team and Its Goal
To complete what might seem like a long and arduous process
and, more importantly, to adequately protect itself both legally
and financially, the purchaser's due diligence team should be
formed as soon as possible. This team should, at a minimum, be
composed of the purchaser's technical staff familiar with opera-
tions at the Facility, legal counsel, and an environmental consult-
ing firm. 7' The environmental consultant should be retained by
the purchaser's counsel to protect, to the extent possible, the at-
torney-client privilege.
The team's mission is to analyze the information obtained
about the Target and to quantify the potential liability if the trans-
action is consummated. The information that should be sorted out
includes the legal issues affecting the Facility, such as pending
litigation, as well as environmental, health, and safety issues such
as on-site and off-site contamination, compliance with the
Facility's permit parameters, and compliance with OSHA's stan-
dards.
Recall that operations at the Facility in our hypothetical trans-
action are industrial in nature. Thus, hazardous wastes are gener-
ated on a routine basis. It is important to realize that the purchase
of such a facility is likely to involve some level of risk. Further-
more, while the goal of the due diligence investigation is to iden-
tify and quantify this risk, the task of precisely quantifying envi-
ronmental risk under CERCLA is not possible for a number of
reasons.
171. John L. Payne, Environmental Auditing: Beyond Due Diligence, in THE
IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ON REAL ESTATE AND OTHER COMMERCIAL
TRANSACTIONS, C945 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 317, 324-26 (1994).
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One reason that environmental risk is so difficult to quantify
may be illustrated in the following example. If the Target's haz-
ardous wastes were, in fact, sent to a Superfund site, the due
diligence team would need to ascertain a number of factors, in-
cluding how much waste was sent to the site, the Target's per-
centage of the total volume of waste, and the estimated cost of
cleaning up the site. The extent of contamination at the site, how-
ever, may be difficult to determine."' Furthermore, since
remediation at the site may extend over a period of many years,
it may be impossible to place a precise dollar amount on the per-
centage of the cleanup costs that will ultimately be allocated to
the Target and other PRPs.'73 In addition, the Target may have
sent waste to a site that has not yet been designated a Superfund
site, but which may later be included on the National Priorities
List. Thus, if the purchaser decides to go forward with the trans-
action, it must do so with the understanding that an "unknown"
potential for liability will always accompany the deal.'74
It is important to keep in mind that many of the problems that
are identified in the course of the due diligence investigation can
be managed and solved in creative ways. The parties may agree
that a portion of the purchase price be held in escrow for a speci-
fied period of time or that the purchase price be paid out in in-
stallments.'75 Another approach is to require the seller to pur-
chase "First Party Pollution Cleanup/Environmental Remediation
Insurance" coverage.'76 Although this type of insurance is limit-
ed in scope, in that it only covers government-mandated cleanup
172. See Bonnie H. Keen, Tax Assessment of Contaminated Property: Tax
Breaks for Polluters?, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 885, 898 (1992).
173. Id. at 898.
174. Chris M. Amantea & Stephen C. Jones, The Growth of Environmental
Issues in Government Contracting, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 1585, 1628 (1994).
175. See Shawn R. Farrell, Casenote, Leo v. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp.:
Recognizing a Need for Congressional Reform in Toxic Tort Actions, 7 VILL.
ENVTL. L.J. 109, 125 (1996).
176. See Julia A. Solo, Urban Decay and the Role of Superfund: Legal Barri-
ers to Redevelopment and Prospects for Change, 43 BuFF. L. REv. 285, 300
(1995) (quoting Michael D. Zarin, Who Pays to Clean Up the Property? Man-
aging the Risks With the Insurance, N.Y. L.J., June 6, 1994, at S8) (stating that,
while it exists, such coverage is expensive)).
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costs for a limited period of time, it can offer the purchaser a
limited measure of comfort and protection. Again, the creative
problem-solving approach, particularly in the practice of environ-
mental law, can help move a transaction towards closing in a
manner that is satisfactory to both parties.
B. The Environmental Site Assessment
In certain transactions, arranging for the performance of an
environmental site assessment ("ESA") is a sensitive issue for all
parties involved. For example, in auction sales, where the pur-
chaser is one among many bidders, the seller may refuse to allow
access to the facility, at least at the outset, in order to limit dis-
ruption to the facility. 7 Once the field has been narrowed
down to one or two candidates, the seller may allow the potential
purchaser or purchasers to visit the facility with their due dili-
gence teams. A purchaser's bid may, in fact, be contingent upon
the performance of a satisfactory ESA at a subsequent date.
In negotiated transactions, such as in our hypothetical transac-
tion, the performance of an ESA is typically addressed early in
the negotiation process. In preparing for the ESA, the first order
of business is to identify the scope of the investigation. The actu-
al performance of the ESA may take place in "Phases," common-
ly referred to as Phase I, Modified Phase I, Phase II, and Phase
III, the remediation process.' Each Phase of the ESA widens
the scope of investigation and requires the implementation of
more invasive procedures.'
While each transaction has its own particular concerns that
require the attention of the purchaser's advisors, certain basic in-
quiries should be addressed in every ESA. To this end, the Amer-
ican Society for Testing and Materials has developed guidelines
(the "ASTM Standard") for the performance of ESAs. 8 ° Adher-
177. For a discussion of the auction process, see Alan R. Kravets, Going, Go-
ing, Gone! Real Estate Auctions in the 90s, PROB. & PROP., May-June, 1993, at
38.
178. See PHASE I ENVIRONMENTAL SITE ASSESSMENT PROCESS, supra note 91,
§ 1.1.1.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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ence to the ASTM Standard is important because it assists in
satisfying one of the requirements of CERCLA's innocent land-
owner defense: the purchaser made all appropriate inquiry into
the previous ownership and uses of the property.
81
Under the ASTM Standard, Phase I has four components which
the environmental consultant is required to follow.'82 The first
component consists of a records review. Information is gathered
to identify potential sources of contamination in connection with
the property and surrounding sites.'83 In addition, the environ-
mental consultant will review current and historical aerial photo-
graphs to ascertain the previous uses of the facility in ques-
tion.'84 The second component is a site reconnaissance. The
objective of this is to obtain information that identifies recognized
environmental conditions in connection with the property.'85
This component generally includes an inspection of the exterior
and interior of the facility, a determination of the geological,
hydrological, and topographical condition of the property, and
identification, to the extent visually or physically observable, of
the past and current uses of the property.'86 Interviews with the
owners and occupants of the facility and local government offi-
cials make up the third component of the ASTM Standard.'87
Again, the objective is to try to gain information pertinent to the
facility's history and age.'88 Finally, the fourth component re-
quires the environmental consultant to prepare a report document-
ing his findings and the sources for his conclusions. 89
The scope of the Phase I ESA may be expanded into a Modi-
fied Phase I ESA. The Modified Phase I ESA should generally
181. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(35)(A), 9601(35)(B).
182. PHASE I ENVIRONMENTAL SITE ASSESSMENT PROCESS, supra note 91,
§ 6.2.
183. Id. § 7.2.1.
184. Id. § 7.3.4.
185. Id. § 6.4.
186. Id. § 8.4.1 to 8.4.4.7.
187. Stephen G. Hamel, The ASTM Standard for Phase I Environmental Site
Assessments, 22 COLO. LAW. 2265, 2265 (1993).
188. Mark Halloran, Environmental Site Assessments, PRAC. LAW., July 1995,
at 61, 67.
189. Id.
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include a more detailed characterization of the facility's opera-
tions"9° and its management practices.' 9' The final report
should provide liability and risk evaluations and recommendations
for managing the issues identified in the ESA.' 92 In addition,
the report should provide recommendations for Phase II testing if
it is deemed necessary.
93
If the environmental consultant concludes that there is potential
for on-site contamination, he may recommend that a Phase II
ESA be performed.' 94 The techniques employed in a Phase II
ESA will vary depending on, among other things, the physical
conditions of the property, how quickly the results are needed,
and the dollar limitations that may be imposed by the purchas-
er.9 The performance of the Phase II ESA may, in turn, reveal
that the on-site contamination is not significant. Alternatively, the
Phase II may uncover very serious contamination at the site. If
the contamination is indeed serious, remediation of the site will
be required. 96 Whatever the results of the ESAs may be, the
purchaser should take full advantage of this part of the negotia-
tion process to obtain as much information as possible about the
environmental condition of the site.
C. Protection of the ESA Report
Obviously, the ESA report may contain extremely sensitive
information, and one would expect that its contents should remain
confidential. It should, however, be noted that once delivered to
the purchaser's attorney, the ESA report may be discoverable,
notwithstanding the attorney work product privilege,' 97 the attor-
ney-client privilege,19 8  and the self-critical analysis
190. The Phase I report addresses, for example, significant air, water and haz-
ardous substances issues. See id. at 66.
191. Hamel, supra note 187, at 2266.
192. Halloran, supra note 188, at 67. See also Hamel, supra note 187, at 2266.
193. Halloran, supra note 188, at 67.
194. Id. at 67-68.
195. Id. at 68.
196. Id.
197. 8 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2025, at 370-71 (2d ed. 1994).
198. Id. § 2017, at 266-70.
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privilege.'" For example, the ESA report will not be entitled to
protection under the attorney work product privilege unless it was
prepared in contemplation of litigation and, then, only the
attorney's work product will remain privileged.z° In other
words, the facts set forth in the ESA are discoverable.
The attorney-client privilege is meant to protect confidential
communications between the client or the client's representatives
and the attorney and the attorney's representatives in furtherance
of the rendition of legal services. 2a' The privilege may, howev-
er, be waived by the client, or may be lost if the privileged infor-
mation is disclosed to a third party.2 °2 For example, if the re-
sults of the ESA are reported to a third party or to a regulatory
agency through certain reporting requirements prescribed by regu-
lation, °3 this disclosure might be viewed as waiver of the attor-
ney-client privilege.2°
The protection provided by the self-critical analysis privilege is
still evolving. In Reichhold Chemicals v. Textron, °5 a case that
was greeted with great enthusiasm by the business community,
the District Court for the Northern District of Florida held that an
entity's retrospective self-assessment of its compliance with envi-
ronmental regulations should be privileged under certain circum-
stances.' Specifically, the Reichhold court held that this privi-
lege applied "only to reports which were prepared after the fact
for the purpose of candid self-evaluation and analysis of the
cause and effect of past pollution .. .. "207 The court further
held that the reports would be entitled to the privilege only if
they were created with the expectation that they would remain
199. 23 id. § 5431, at 346 (2d ed. Supp. 1995).
200. 8 id. § 2024, at 336-38 (2d ed. 1994).
201. 4 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 126.11[2], at
26-174 to 26-177 (2d ed. 1995).
202. Id. at 26-185.
203. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 302.6 (1995) (reporting requirements under
CERCLA), § 264.56 (1995) (reporting requirements under RCRA).
204. MOORE ET AL., supra note 201, R 26.11[21, at 26-185.
205. 157 F.R.D. 522 (N.D. Fla. 1994).
206. Id.
207. Id.
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confidential and they had, in fact, been kept confidential."° Fi-
nally, the court noted that this qualified privilege could be over-
come if one or more of the defendants in the case could demon-
strate extraordinary circumstances or a special need to obtain the
reports.2°9
EPA recently addressed the issue of the self-critical analysis
privilege. On April 3, 1995, EPA issued an interim policy state-
ment on voluntary environmental self-policing and self-disclo-
sure.210 This statement was intended to promote environmental
compliance by providing greater certainty as to the agency's en-
forcement response to voluntary self-evaluations, voluntary dis-
closure, and the prompt correction of violations."' EPA's policy
favors incentives over privileges.2 2 As such, environmental au-
dits are not treated as privileged.2"3 Instead, the policy provides
that EPA will reduce civil penalties and refrain from making
criminal referrals under certain conditions. 4 Essentially, the
policy requires regulated entities which discover a violation
through a voluntary environmental audit to disclose the violation
to the appropriate agency when discovered2"5 and to correct the
violation within sixty days of such discovery.216 The other con-
ditions which must be satisfiedare: (1) the entity must act expe-
ditiously in remedying a condition that creates an imminent dan-
ger to human health and the environment;217 (2) the entity must
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Voluntary Environmental Self-Policing and Self-Disclosure Interim Policy
Statement, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,875-879 (1995) [hereinafter Interim Policy] (stating
that the policy seeks "to provide incentives for regulated entities that conduct vol-
untary compliance evaluations and also disclose and correct violations").
211. Id. at 16,876.
212. Id. at 16,878.
213. Id. at 16,876-878.
214. Id. at 16,877-878.
215. Id. at 16,877. Additionally, the violation must be reported "prior to (1) the
commencement of a federal, state or local agency inspection, investigation or
information request; (2) notice of a citizen suit; (3) legal complaint by a third
party; or (4) the regulated entity's knowledge that the discovery of the violation
by a regulated agency or third party was imminent." Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
1996] 383
384 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VII
implement appropriate measures to prevent a recurrence of the
violation; 18 (3) the violation does not indicate that the entity
failed to take appropriate steps to avoid repeat or recurring viola-
tions;219 and (4) the entity cooperates with EPA by providing
requested documents, as well as access to employees during the
investigation of the violation."
It should be noted that a number of state legislatures have en-
acted laws creating a qualified privilege for ESA reports.22' Ac-
knowledging this trend, EPA's policy provides that, in order to
maintain national consistency, the agency will scrutinize enforce-
ment more closely in states with an audit privilege.2 The poli-
cy also provides that EPA may increase federal enforcement
where environmental self-evaluation privileges or penalty immu-
nities prevent a state from obtaining
(1) information needed to establish criminal liability; (2) facts
needed to establish the nature and extent of a violation; (3) appro-
priate penalties for creating an imminent and substantial endanger-
ment or serious harm to human health or the environment, or from
recovering economic benefit; (4) appropriate sanctions or penalties
for criminal conduct and repeat violations; or (5) prompt correc-
tion of violations, and expeditious remediation of those that in-
volve imminent and substantial endangerment to human health or
the environment.223
Whether EPA's policy succeeds in its goal of encouraging volun-
tary disclosure of violations in exchange for immunity from cer-
tain penalties remains to be seen. For the time being, it is impor-
tant to keep in mind that a company's environmental audit will
not be considered privileged information under EPA's new en-
forcement policy.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Some of the states that have passed such legislation are Colorado, Indiana,
Kentucky, Oregon, and Texas. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-25-126.5 (Supp. 1995);
IND. CODE ANN. § 13-10-3-3 (Bums Supp. 1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 224.01-040 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1995); OR. REv. STAT. § 468.963(1) (1992);
TEx. Gov'T CODE ANN. §522.124 (West Supp. 1995).
222. Interim Policy, supra note 210, at 16,878.
223. Id.
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D. Closing the Transaction
At the completion of the ESA and other due diligence, the
purchaser should have a fair idea of the risks and benefits that the
transaction has to offer. Even if the results of the ESA are unfa-
vorable, they may lead to further meaningful negotiations. The
parties may consider changing the structure of the transaction, or
reducing the purchase price to reflect an increase in potential
environmental liability associated with the Facility. For example,
in a recent transaction, the authors facilitated the closing of a
transaction in which the facility in question had severe on-site
contamination, by providing, in the purchase agreement, that the
seller would remediate the site post-closing. This procedure shift-
ed environmental liability in a manner that was acceptable to both
parties and was essential to closing the transaction.
As previously mentioned, another avenue of negotiation might
entail an escrow arrangement, pursuant to which, as a safeguard,
a portion of the purchase price is held in escrow by a third party
for a period of years following the closing. In the end, the pur-
chaser may determine that it is not in its best interests to go for-
ward with the transaction. Regardless of the purchaser's decision,
the performance of an ESA will have armed the purchaser with
knowledge critical to make an informed determination.
CONCLUSION
The parties to a commercial real estate transaction must be
aware of the environmental issues that confront them. There are
several laws, on both the federal and state levels, that the parties
must consider. CERCLA will likely be the most prominent feder-
al law in such a commercial real estate transaction. The broad
scope of this law and its expansive liability scheme make
CERCLA an important issue. The parties must also be aware of
state laws, such as New Jersey's ISRA. The scope of these laws
is not limited to the seller and purchaser. The lender must also
ensure compliance with these laws. Failure to do so could lead to
lender liability.
This liability scheme makes the allocation of risk of environ-
mental liability between the parties a vital issue in a commercial
deal. When structuring the transaction, the parties have several
options. Regardless of how the deal is structured, issues such as
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corporate liability, successor liability, and corporate officer liabili-
ty must all be considered. The Purchase Agreement should be
utilized by the parties to make clear to what extent each party
will be responsible for environmental exposure.
The best way to limit the liability of the parties, however, is to
learn as much about the subject property as possible, prior to the
closing of the transaction. The due diligence investigation is an
important part of this process. From the selection of the due dili-
gence team to the preparation of the environmental assessment
and the protection of the information therein, each step of the due
diligence process should play a significant role in the commercial
real estate transaction. It is important to remember that environ-
mental issues need to be managed as any other legal or business
issue, logically and systematically. The prudent purchaser must,
therefore, realize that, under the current state of the law, environ-
mental issues must be factored into the cost of doing business.
